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REINCARNATION OF STATE COURTS
Fifth Annual Roy R. Ray Lecture*
by
Shirley S Abrahamson
Justice, Wisconsin Supreme Court
AM honored to have been selected to deliver the Fifth Annual Roy R.
Ray Lecture, named in honor of Professor Emeritus Roy R. Ray of
this faculty, and to have the opportunity to speak with the faculty,
students, and alumni of this distinguished university.
I speak today of a subject near and dear to me-state courts. I have
been sitting on the highest court of the State of Wisconsin for six years,
and I am eligible to sit for another twenty-two years. I have pondered long
and hard about how to present state courts to you. My law clerk gave me
what he considered sage advice. He said I should remember to be neither
partial on the one hand nor impartial on the other.
The title of my lecture is, as you know, "Reincarnation of State Courts."
The word reincarnation, like most words, has several meanings and us-
ages. The one I use is that of a "rebirth." A major theme of this lecture is
that in the 1980s there will, I believe, be a "rebirth" of the state courts, a
rebirth in the sense of a renewed recognition of the significance of the work
of the state courts. In the past three decades, when mention was made of
courts, both the legal and academic communities and the public thought of
federal courts. The 1980s will be the decade of the state courts. I think by
the end of the 1980s a lawyer or academician might look at the state courts
and say, "You've come a long way, Baby." The state courts have always
been important, but it's taken some people in the legal world, including the
state judges themselves, a long time to recognize this fact.
I deliberately chose to use the word reincarnation rather than the word
rebirth so that I could conjure up the image of old concepts returning to
the earth in new forms. The old concepts to which I refer are two recur-
ring themes in American legal history, states' rights and individual rights. I
Both states' rights and individual rights predate the founding of this coun-
*This Article is a revised and annotated version of the lecture delivered at Southern
Methodist University School of Law, Dallas, Texas, March 5, 1982.
1. See ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, AMERICAN FEDER-
ALISM: TOWARD A MORE EFFECTIVE PARTNERSHIP (1975); B. MARSHALL, FEDERALISM
AND CIVIL RIGHTS (1964); Developments in the Law, Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 1133, 1135-83 (1977); Comment, Theories of Federalism and Civil Rights, 75 YALE
L.J. 1007, 1017-29 (1966).
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try. These two concepts return in the 1980s in new forms, called "new
federalism" or "recycled federalism."' 2 In judicial jargon new federalism
describes a growing awareness in the state courts of the importance of state
law, especially state constitutional law, as the basis for the protection of
individual rights against state government. New federalism describes the
willingness of state courts to assert themselves as the final arbiters in ques-
tions of their citizens' individual rights by relying on their own law, espe-
cially the state constitutions. New federalism is based on the premise that
the federal Constitution establishes minimum, rather than maximum,
guarantees of individual rights and that, in appropriate cases, state courts
should independently determine, according to their own law (generally
their own state constitutions), the degree to which individual rights will be
protected within the state jurisdiction. Independent interpretation of the
state's own constitution is part of the double security of having both fed-
eral and state bills of rights.
Legal literature has used the term new federalism to refer to the rela-
tionship of the federal and state courts before President Reagan popular-
ized. the term in his 1980 campaign. President Reagan proposes, as you
know, decentralizing governmental activities so that many federally legis-
lated and administered programs will be established and maintained by
the states and localities. President Reagan's proposals have engendered
intensive discussions about the proper alignment of power between the
central government and the states. You will soon realize that many of the
arguments relating to Reagan's new federalism have counterparts in my
discussion of new federalism for the judicial branch.
In the 1980s it may very well be the state supreme court, not the United
States Supreme Court, that will be the significant constitutional law court.
And the state supreme court will be looking to its own law; it will be inter-
preting the state constitution, not the United States Constitution.
My theme then is the emerging role of state courts in relation to the
federal courts and the emerging role of state law, especially state constitu-
tional law, in relation to federal constitutional law.
In law school it is customary to use hypotheticals. I will follow prece-
dent. Suppose that University Park, the municipality in which Southern
Methodist University is located, has an ordinance requiring every speaker
in the community who will address an audience of more than fifty persons
to submit the text of his or her speech twenty-four hours in advance of the
speech to obtain a license for the public gathering. I think you all recog-
nize that this ordinance is in trouble. Let us suppose that the year is 1921,
the tenth anniversary of the founding of Southern Methodist University,
and I am here to speak on that occasion. What provision of law protects
my right to speak?
If your answer is the first amendment to the federal Constitution you are
2. "I detect a phoenix-like resurrection of federalism, or, if you prefer, states' rights,
evidenced by state courts' reliance upon provisions of state constitutions." Mosk, The State
Courts, in AMERICAN LAW-THE THIRD CENTURY 216 (B. Schwartz ed. 1976).
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wrong. Although in the early part of the twentieth century a minority of
Justices of the United States Supreme Court were pressing for recognition
of free expression as a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the federal
Constitution against state action, these Justices were the minority 3 Hav-
ing the dissenting Justices on your side doesn't mean you're right, nor does
it mean you're wrong. It does mean, however, that you lose.
In 1921 1, the speaker, was not protected by the federal Constitution. I
was nevertheless protected by article I, section 8, of the Texas Constitution,
which guarantees that "[e]very person shall be at liberty to speak, write or
publish his opinions on any subject." 4 The freedom of speech and press
provision of the Texas Constitution differs from the text of the first amend-
ment.5 In 1921 you and I would go to the Texas trial court to seek the
protection of my rights under the state constitution.
Now suppose this was the year 1969, the forty-fourth anniversary of the
founding of this law school. Here I am again, and University Park has, in
the Vietnam years, reenacted its former ordinance. What provisions of law
protect my right to speak? If this were 1969 you'd answer, without hesita-
tion, the first amendment to the federal Constitution. This time you would
be right. The dissenters obviously got some votes. And we would then be
faced with the issue of what court to go to, state or federal. You and I
could still go to the Texas trial court to seek protection of my rights under
the federal Constitution. Remember that the state courts have the power,
indeed the duty, to enforce the federal Constitution and federal law. The
Texas judges take an oath, as I do, to support the federal Constitution.
Article VI of the federal Constitution provides: "This Constitution, and
the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof
• ..shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State
to the Contrary notwithstanding."
3. See Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 343 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Patter-
son v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 465 (1907) (Harlan, J., dissenting). In Prudential Ins. Co. of
Am. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 543 (1922), the Court stated that "neither the Fourteenth
Amendment nor any other provision of the Constitution of the United States imposes upon
the States any restrictions about 'freedom of speech'...
4. TEX. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, provides:
Every person shall be at liberty to speak, write or publish his opinions on any
subject, being responsible for the abuse of that privilege; and no law shall ever
be passed curtailing the liberty of speech or of the press. In prosecutions for
the publication of papers, investigating the conduct of officers, or men in pub-
lic capacity, or when the matter published is proper for public information, the
truth thereof may be given in evidence. And in all indictments for libels, the
jury shall have the right to determine the law and the facts, under the direction
of the court, as in other cases.
5. The first amendment states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Govern-
ment for a redress of grievances." U.S. CoNsr. amend. I.
For a discussion of the Texas Constitution of 1876 and its Bill of Rights, see Hart, The Bill
ofRights.- Safeguard of Individual Liberty, 35 TEX. L. REv. 919 (1957); Thomas & Thomas,
The Texas Constitution of 1876, 35 TEX. L. REV. 907 (1957).
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Having a 1969 mind set we would probably have avoided the Texas trial
court. We would probably have gone to the federal district court, believ-
ing it to be a more receptive forum for preservation of individual rights
than is the state trial court.
Now it is 1982 and I have returned, older but not really surprised at my
advanced age to find again that University Park has recently adopted a
similar ordinance. Old fights don't stay won. What provision of law pro-
tects my right to speak in 1982? If you are a good constitutional lawyer
your answer should be that my rights are doubly protected, protected by
the Texas Constitution and protected by the federal Constitution. You
might say we should talk about which constitution we want to rely upon.
And now in 1982 we will again face the question of whether to go to fed-
eral or to state court.
In my hypothetical, the facts are the same in 1921, 1969, and 1982. The
University Park ordinance, the Texas Constitution, and the United States
Constitution are the same in 1921, 1969, and 1982. Yet the answers to the
same question have changed. Why? This hypothetical reminds me of my
teaching federal income tax at the University of Wisconsin Law School. I
gave the same exam each year; I just changed the answers. To understand
the 1921, 1969, and 1982 answers to my ordinance hypothetical, let's go
back to our two themes-states' rights and individual rights.
We'll talk about states' rights first. I use the terms states' rights and
federalism interchangeably. Both refer to the division of power between
the central authority and the constituent jurisdictions. Throughout most of
our country's history fundamentally different views have persisted about
the nature of the American government: Is it a federal or national system?
A federal system of government is one formed by the confederacy of sev-
eral states that retain residual powers of government. In contrast to a fed-
eral government, a national government is a union of people under a
single sovereign government.
In 1787, when the federal Constitution was drafted, a decision had to be
made whether there would be a compact among state sovereignties or a
union of the whole people. The decision was never made. Our Constitu-
tion is a compromise. Madison described the new government as partly
national, partly federal.6
Our founding fathers left us with two governments, state and federal-
two governments governing the same people in the same geographic terri-
tory. In addition to the division of powers between the federal and state
governments, we have delegated the legislative, executive, and judicial
functions to three separate branches of government. Thus we live in a
country with a dual court system, federal and state, operating side by side.
Conflict is endemic in the system. When we talk of new federalism, judi-
cial federalism, we talk of the respective spheres of federal and state courts.
6. Madison, The Federalist No. 39, in THE ENDURING FEDERALIST 164-68 (C. Beard
ed. 1948).
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The framers thought these conflicts could be tolerated, and the framers
relied upon these conflicts to operate as checks and balances on the power
of the governments. Setting up a government with these internal conflicts
illustrates colonial America's distrust of government, and leads me to the
second theme: individual rights.
Protection of individual rights by a formal constitution starts with the
state constitutions, which predate the federal Constitution. Between 1776
and 1784 each of the original thirteen states adopted its own constitution,
which asserted the principle that citizens' individual liberties were to be
protected against government action. Formal bills of rights were part of
many of the colonial charters and revolutionary declarations and constitu-
tions.7 During the months preceding independence, uniformity of state
constitutions was debated but rejected in favor of the states calling conven-
tions to draw up constitutions satisfactory to the respective states. Diver-
sity was the politically realistic answer.8
From an historical standpoint state constitutions have a real signifi-
cance. The draftsmen of the federal Constitution used the state constitu-
tions and state experience as models for the federal Constitution. Strange
as it seems, states formed after the drafting of the federal Constitution did
not look to it as a model for their own constitutions. They looked to their
territorial framework of government (like the Northwest Ordinance) or to
the constitutions of their sister states.
Thus the 1848 Wisconsin Constitution, which is Wisconsin's first and
only constitution, was patterned after the New York Constitution, because
the Wisconsin Constitution was adopted by a convention in which New
Yorkers were prominent.9
The present Texas Constitution dates back to 1876 and is the eighth
constitution of this state.' 0 The 1876 Texas constitution was based on the
1845 constitution and the constitutions of other states, particularly Penn-
sylvania and Louisiana. " I
Although the state constitutions had bills of rights, the federal Constitu-
tion as originally drafted in 1787 had no bill of rights, no list of protections
of individual rights. The Bill of Rights, the first ten amendments to the
7. 1 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 49-379 (1971).
8. Linde, Book Review, 52 OR. L. REV. 325, 334 (1973) (reviewing B. SCHWARTZ,
supra note 7).
9. A. SMITH, THE HISTORY OF WISCONSIN: FROM EXPLORATION TO STATEHOOD 653
(1973).
10. The 1824 Constitution of the Republic of Mexico recognized Coahuila and Texas as
a single state and provided that each state should frame its own constitution. The state of
Coahuila and Texas published a constitution in 1827. In 1832 Texas drew up a separate
state constitution, which was not approved by the Mexican Congress. In 1836 the Republic
of Texas adopted its own constitution. Texas was admitted to the Union with the constitu-
tion of 1845. In 1861 Texas amended its constitution to reflect Texas's transfer of allegiance.
After the civil war a convention drafted and the voters approved the constitution of 1866. In
1869 the 1868 or Reconstruction Constitution was ratified by voters. In 1876 the present
constitution was ratified by the voters. See 1 TEX. CONST. ANN. preamble (Vernon 1955); 2
C. WHARTON, TEXAS UNDER MANY FLAGS 230-31 (1930).
11. 1 TEX. CONST. ANN. preamble (Vernon 1955).
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Constitution, was adopted by Congress on September 25, 1789, and rati-
fied on December 15, 1791.
It was assumed at adoption that the Bill of Rights would limit only the
federal government's exercise of power. There was no need to limit the
states; the state constitutions did that. The assumption that the eight
amendments limited only the federal government became constitutional
doctrine in 1833 in the case of Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore,12 an opinion
written by Chief Justice John Marshall.
It was the Civil War amendments to the Constitution, the thirteenth,
fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments, that wrote into the Constitution
broad new guarantees of liberty and equality by which the federal govern-
ment committed itself to protect citizens against states. Nationalism was
the spirit of the Civil War.
Not long after the passage of the fourteenth amendment, however, it was
argued in the Slaughter-House Cases of 187213 that the fourteenth amend-
ment had the effect of blanketing in the original Bill of Rights as limita-
tions upon state action. The United States Supreme Court rejected this
theory. It refused to say that the fourteenth amendment protected a Loui-
siana butcher from a state-created monopoly in slaughtering.
It was not until 1925 in Gitlow v. New York 14 that the United States
Supreme Court in a dictum recognized that the free speech guarantees of
the first amendment applied to the states as a result of the fourteenth
amendment. '5
Thus for most of the history of this country-namely, for 138 years,
from 1787 to 1925 (the date of the founding of this law school)-the fed-
eral Bill of Rights offered citizens little or no protection in their relations
with the state and local governments. The individual state constitutions
offered them those protections.
Armed with state law and the state constitution, and operating in an
area that received little or no federal attention, the state courts could con-
tribute to the development of preservation of freedom of expression and
other rights guaranteed by the states' constitutions. From 1787 to 1925 the
state constitution, not the federal Constitution, was the primary source of
protection of individual rights. Remember, in 1921 when I came to Uni-
versity Park, I was protected by only the state constitution.
12. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 242 (1833).
13. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
14. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
15. In Gitlow the Court said:
For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of speech and
of the press-which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgement
by Congress-are among the fundamental personal rights and "liberties" pro-
tected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impair-
ment by the States.
268 U.S. at 666. In later cases the Supreme Court viewed Gitiow as settling the issue that the
first amendment applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g.,
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368 (1931); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 386-87
(1927); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371 (1927).
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The states' records in preserving individual rights in the years from 1787
to 1925 are not uniform within each state or from state to state. Some
states, in some areas, have records of which they can be proud. In the area
of appointment of counsel for indigent criminal defendants at public ex-
pense, the states' records are good, far ahead of the federal government's
record.In 1859 the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Carpenter v. Dane County,'6 as
a matter of its own state constitutional law, required counties to appoint
counsel for indigent felons at county expense. It was not until 1963, 104
years after the Wisconsin Supreme Court had acted, that the United States
Supreme Court required, as a matter of fourteenth amendment due proc-
ess, a state to provide counsel in state felony trials.17 By the time the
United States Supreme Court imposed this requirement, most states ap-
pointed counsel at public expense, as called for by state constitutions, state
laws, or state practice. In Gideon v. Wainwright the United States Supreme
Court was bringing the few laggards into line.' 8
In other areas of individual rights the states' records are sorry ones in-
deed. And many have said that the states' failure to protect individual
rights in this period created a void, and voids, as you know, are generally
filled. 19
After Gitlow in 1925 the United States Supreme Court started filling the
void. The year 1925 marks the end of the first stage of federalism and the
beginning of the second stage. After 1925 the United States Supreme
Court adopted the rationale that certain aspects of the Bill of Rights were
so necessary to an ordered scheme of liberty that it was reasonable to con-
clude that they were encompassed within the fourteenth amendment and
therefore were applicable to the states. The process of absorption began.
As late as 1961, only twenty years ago, less than a handful of the twenty-
four or twenty-five specific rights of the first eight amendments to the fed-
eral Constitution were held to be absorbed into the fourteenth amendment
and applicable to the states. From 1961 to about 1970, however, the
United States Supreme Court made many, but not all, of the provisions of
the Bill of Rights applicable to the states. In a decade, the 1960s, the four-
teenth amendment was used to impose national standards of fair proce-
dure and equal treatment on states and localities.
As the federal constitutional guarantees grew during the Warren Court
years, the protection of individual rights under the state constitutions al-
most came to a halt. In the 1960s the United States Supreme Court went
faster and probably farther than many of the state courts were willing to
go. Not inclined to take the lead, state courts followed, some reluctantly,
the lead of the United States Supreme Court. During the 1960s most law-
16. 9 Wis. 274, 278 (1859).
17. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
18. Id
19. See Sheran, State Courts and Federalism in the 1980's." Comment, 22 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 789, 790-91 (1981).
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yers, academicians, and state courts tended to follow the decisions of the
United States Supreme Court. They did not examine the state constitution
to determine whether it afforded the same or greater rights.20 The 1960s
was the zenith of the second period of federalism and individual rights.
The emphasis was on the central government. You remember that when I
spoke in University Park in 1969 we viewed my rights as protected by the
first amendment.
In the 1970s we find new faces on the United States Supreme Court
bench. In 1976 the New York Times would write:
There was a time not so far distant when the United States Supreme
Court was the staunch and ultimate defender of civil rights and liber-
ties. . . .[T]he Court [now] seems clearly to be beating a retreat from
its once proud forward position in this delicate and difficult area of
the relationship between citizen and state.21
I am not sure that there has been such a retreat. Certainly some decisions
since 1970 have been highly protective of citizens' rights against both state
and federal action. Nevertheless, Justice Brennan, writing in the Harvard
Law Review in the spring of 1977, pointed out what he and others saw as
two significant changes in the United States Supreme Court and its atti-
tude toward individual rights. 22 First, Justice Brennan and others saw a
retrenchment of the Supreme Court from its aggressive position in protect-
ing the rights of citizens against both state and federal encroachments; 23
second, they saw the conscious barring of the door to federal courthouses
by procedural devices to limit adjudication of claims against state action. 24
In the 1960s Justice Brennan spoke of the Bill of Rights as the primary
source of constitutional liberty.25 In the 1970s Justice Brennan repeatedly
urged state courts to look to their own constitutions and to become a new
"font of individual liberties."'26
20. One exception was McCauley v. Tropic of Cancer, 20 Wis. 2d 134, 139, 121 N.W.2d
545, 548 (1963).
21. N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1976, at 40, col. 1.
22. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 489 (1977).
23. Id. at 495.
24. Id. at 501.
25. See sources cited in Galie & Galie, State Constitutional Guarantees and Supreme
Court Review: Justice Marshall's Proposal in Oregon v. Hass, 82 DICK. L. REV. 273, 275 n. 14
(1978); see also Sobeloff, Fegieralism and Individual Liberties-Can We Have Both?, 1965
WASH. U.L.Q. 296 (federal system justifiable when it operates to maximize the liberty of
persons as against the central government).
26. Brennan, supra note 22, at 491. Justice Brennan continued:
The essential point I am making, of course, is not that the United States
Supreme Court is necessarily wrong in its interpretation of the federal Consti-
tution, or that ultimate constitutional truths invariably come prepackaged in
the dissents, including my own, from decisions of the Court. It is simply that
the decisions of the Court are not, and should not be, dispositive of questions
regarding rights guaranteed by counterpart provisions of state law. Accord-
ingly, such decisions are not mechanically applicable to state law issues, and
state court judges and the members of the bar seriously err if they so treat
them. Rather, state court judges, and also practitioners, do well to scrutinize
constitutional decisions by federal courts, for only if they are found to be logi-
cally persuasive and well-reasoned, paying due regard to precedent and the
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Personally, I do not view the United States Supreme Court develop-
ments in the 1970s as the result of ill motives or a conscious desire to limit
individual rights. The present may be a time for the Court to digest the
changes and fill in the details of earlier doctrine, rather than break new
ground. There are good reasons for limiting access to the federal courts
when their procedures duplicate fair and constitutionally sufficient state
court procedures. Redundant procedures exhaust judge power, a precious
and limited commodity, and may have the effect of limiting or diluting the
quality of justice for all litigants. In any event, the purpose of this speech
is neither to praise nor to condemn either the Warren or the Burger Court.
It is clear, in view of the recent decisional trends of the United States
Supreme Court, that litigants will become more and more dependent upon
their state courts in matters of civil liberties than they have in the recent
past. Thus, in the 1980s we reach the third stage of the interrelation of
federalism and individual rights. Once again we look to state courts and
state constitutions. But there is a difference. In the 1980s, unlike pre-1925,
the federal Constitution is a federal safety net for the protection of individ-
ual rights.
Thus, in 1982 when I speak in University Park and worry about the
ordinance, I have double security for my rights-both the federal and state
constitutions.
Let us move from my hypothetical free speech case to an actual case in
the 1970s involving the individual's protection against unreasonable search
and seizure. I speak of Texas v. White.27 Mr. White was arrested by
Amarillo police officers while he was attempting to pass fraudulent checks.
He was taken to the police station and questioned. Although he refused to
consent to have his auto searched, the police conducted a search and seized
four wrinkled checks that corresponded to those he had attempted to pass.
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution protects individ-
policies underlying specific constitutional guarantees, may they properly claim
persuasive weight as guideposts when interpreting counterpart state guaran-
tees. I suggest to the bar that, although in the past it might have been safe for
counsel to raise only federal constitutional issues in state courts, plainly it
would be most unwise these days not also to raise the state constitutional
questions.
Id at 502 (footnote omitted); see also Brennan, Guardians of Our Liberties-State Courts No
Less Than Federal, 15 JUDGES' J. 82 (1976).
The 1969 report of the Virginia Commission on Constitutional Revision noted the impor-
tance of the Virginia Bill of Rights as follows:
That most of the provisions of the Virginia Bill of Rights have their
parallel in the Federal Bill of Rights is, in the judgment of the Commission,
no good reason not to look first to Virginia's Constitution for the safeguards of
the fundamental rights of Virginians. The Commission believes that the Vir-
ginia Bill of Rights should be a living and operating instrument of government
and should, by stating the basic safeguards of the people's liberties, minimize
the occasion for Virginians to resort to the Federal Constitution and to the
federal courts.
1969 REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION, part III, at 86; see also
Countryman, Why a State Bill ofRights?, 45 WASH. L. REV. 454 (1970); Force, State "'Bills of
Rights"- A Case of Neglect and the Needfor a Renaissance, 3 VAL. U.L. REV. 125 (1969).
27. 423 U.S. 67 (1975).
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uals against unreasonable searches and seizures. Article I, section 9 of the
Texas Constitution, in language almost identical to that of the fourth
amendment of the United States Constitution, prohibits unreasonable
searches and seizures.
The Texas trial court found the search reasonable under the fourth
amendment. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that the warrant-
less search of the automobile violated the fourth amendment, but made no
reference to the Texas Constitution or statutes.28 The United States
Supreme Court reversed the Texas court, saying the Texas court was
wrong in its interpretation of the fourth amendment and the prior United
States Supreme Court cases.29 The Court sent the case back to the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals. 30 What does this tell us? It tells us that if the
state court incorrectly predicts what the United States Supreme Court will
do, the state court gets reversed.
Justice Thurgood Marshall dissented on the merits and further com-
mented that "it should be clear to the court below that nothing this Court
does today precludes it from reaching the result it did under applicable
state law.'"3' On remand following Justice Marshall's suggestion, the
Texas court considered whether state law could sustain the original opin-
ion. The Texas court concluded that it would not look to the available
state constitution.32 It took a procedural way out, saying that "[a]t no time
during the trial of this case did the appellant urge that Art. I, Sec. 9, of the
Texas Constitution supported his motion to suppress," and "[ilt is funda-
mental that the grounds for reversal urged on appeal must comport with
the objections made at trial."'33 Accordingly, the Court of Criminal Ap-
peals affirmed White's conviction.
Consider Justice Marshall's message. If Texas wants to decide rules of
evidence for Texas courts it can do so. If Justice Marshall were a lone
dissenting voice crying out in the wilderness telling lawyers and state
judges to turn to state law, to state constitutions, to determine how state
courts should process state criminal cases, we might not pay him too much
heed. But Justice Marshall is not alone. We know Justice Brennan agrees
with him. And a majority, if not all, of the other Justices of the United
States Supreme Court recognize that a state may, as a matter of its own
law, impose greater restrictions on state action than the United States
Supreme Court does under federal constitutional standards. Chief Justice
Burger,34 and Justices White,35 Rehnquist, 36 and Stevens37 have expressed
28. White v. Texas, 521 S.W.2d 255, 258 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974), rey'dper curiam, 423
U.S. 67 (1975), on remand, 543 S.W.2d 366 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
29. 423 U.S. at 68.
30. 543 S.W.2d 366 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
31. 423 U.S. at 72.
32. 543 S.W.2d at 370.
33. Id at 369.
34. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 171-72 (1970) (concurring opinion).
35. See Lego.v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972).
36. See PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980); Ross v. Moffitt,
417 U.S. 600, 618-19 (1974).
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similar sentiments. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, then judge of the Ari-
zona Court of Appeals, acknowledged in the 1981 William and Mary Law
Review that state courts are using their own state constitutions as a means
of defining rights of criminal defendants and urged less federal court inter-
vention in state court proceedings. 38
The Burger Court has urged state courts to step forward and apply their
own constitutional doctrine. The Burger Court has taken a states' rights
stance. And the states' rights issue is as controversial in legal circles today
as it was in the nineteenth century. Many resist the Burger Court's sugges-
tion to base state court decisions on the state constitution.
The critics of new federalism are strange bedfellows. The critics are the
nationalists, those who think power should rest with the central govern-
ment. The critics are states' rightists who view the new federalism as a plot
to enlarge protection of individual rights. The critics are the civil libertari-
ans who see new federalism as a technique for the federal government to
get out of the business of ensuring civil liberties and civil rights and who
think it will be harder to persuade fifty state courts instead of one United
States Supreme Court of the correctness of their position. The critics also
include those who fear that the state judges cannot handle the task and
that the job of protecting individual rights will not be done by either the
federal or state courts if new federalism prevails.
There is, as you may know, a bias in the legal system against state
judges. There is a myth that state judges play in the minor leagues of the
American judicial system. The myth is that the best that can be said of
many state judges is that they are buddies of the Governor whom the
judge helped get elected. In contrast, so the myth goes, federal judges are
competent students of the law and are sensitive to individual rights, even if
they are buddies of the Senator or President whom the judge helped get
elected. I do not take this criticism of state judges personally. I obviously
believe individual judges should be judged on their individual merit, not
on profiles or stereotypes. 39
The fact is that the vast bulk of criminal litigation in this country is
handled by state courts. The everyday burglar, robber, rapist, or murderer
has violated state law and is tried in state court. Indeed, the bulk of all
litigation in this country, civil or criminal, is handled by state courts. In
Wisconsin, the federal judicial system is composed of six federal district
judges, nine circuit judges of the Seventh Circuit, and the nine Supreme
Court Justices. The Wisconsin court system has approximately 200 judges.
The state judges are the workhorses. The state courts carry the heavy bur-
den of dispensing justice. It is the state courts that interpret the rules peo-
ple live by. It is the state judges, not the federal judges, who day in and
37. City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 50 U.S.L.W. 4210 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1982).
38. O'Connor, Trends in the Relationship Between the Federal and State Courtsfrom the
Perspective of a State Court Judge, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 801 (1981).
39. For a defense of state judges, see O'Connor, supra note 38, at 812; see also Sumner
v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 547 (1981); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493 n.35 (1976).
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day out decide motions to suppress evidence that was allegedly unlawfully
seized. It is the state judges rather than the federal judges who are proba-
bly best qualified to establish -the guidelines for search and seizure of
automobiles under the state constitution, subject, of course, to the federal
safety net.
And finally among the critics of new federalism are many state judges.
They fear that the state courts cannot take the heat that comes from decid-
ing the tough individual rights cases. They worry that moving the arena of
individual rights from Washington to the state capitals puts the constitu-
tional issues closer to the public, who will become hostile to state court
judges. A state judge in California says, "I am frightened about the reac-
tions of the lay person." 40 He is concerned that the public accepts the
United States Supreme Court as setting ultimate rules and will not accept
the state court's exercising this power. He implies that state judges should
be content to pass the buck to the United States Supreme Court on the
difficult issues. Popularly elected state judges, he says, may have trouble
resisting the popular and political pressures that may be adverse to indi-
vidual rights. Federal judges with lifetime tenure are immunized from
popular pressure and sentiment. There is concern that if the people are
unhappy about a state court decision, they will amend the state constitu-
tion, which in many states may be relatively easy to do. If my memory is
right, the death penalty was put into the California Constitution by the
ballot in response to a decision of the California Supreme Court.
Regardless of the critics, and they make good points and raise difficult
issues, the issue presented by Justice Marshall in Texas v. White and by the
Burger Court is this: Do good lawyering and good judging in the 1980s
require an analysis of the state constitution in addition to or in lieu of an
analysis of the federal Constitution? My answer is an unequivocal "yes."
But to aid you in evaluating my answer, I report, in keeping with the Wis-
consin rules of open government and full disclosure, that a student note in
a recent Marquette Law Review had the following comment about me and
new federalism:
The most vociferous advocate of the new federalism on the Wisconsin
court is Justice Abrahamson. In the most recent term of the court
[1978], Justice Abrahamson has twice written concurring opinions in
which she suggests that the Wisconsin constitutional provision against
unreasonable searches and seizures should serve as the basis for deter-
mining the validity of warrantless searches.41
I should again make clear just what it is that the Marquette Law Review
thinks I am advocating. I am suggesting a process, a process for lawyers to
use in presenting cases involving individual rights and a process for state
courts to use in deciding such cases. I join those who propose that the state
40. Welsh & Collins, Taking State Constitutions Seriously, CENTER MAG., Sept.-Oct.
1981, at 6, 33.
41. Comment, The Independent Application of State Constitutional Provisions to Ques-
tions of Criminal Procedure, 62 MARQ. L. REV. 596, 604 n.49 (1979).
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supreme courts should first examine state law, almost as a matter of rou-
tine, in cases in which individual rights are involved. If the court con-
cludes that state law, whether statute, the exercise of the court's
supervisory power, or the state constitution, protects the rights, the court
should say so.42 The case, should be decided on the independent state
grounds. If analysis of federal law would reach the same result, the hold-
ing can be further based-on federal constitutional law. The court must
make clear, however, that the federal rationale does not dictate the result
of the case. Only by carefully and responsibly explicating the different
bases for the state and federal rationales can the state court justify a deci-
sion as being on independent and adequate state grounds.
I want to make clear that I am not, I am not, advocating a result. I am
advocating a process. Although both proponents and critics of new feder-
alism see the doctrine as a technique to expand protection for individual
rights and to avoid following decisions of the United States Supreme
Court, new federalism does not necessarily work this way. The state court
might decide that the state law provides the same protection as the federal
Constitution, using the same rationale as the United States Supreme
Court, or using different reasons, or that state law provides more protec-
tion than the federal Constitution. I suppose that the state courts might
construe their constitution as providing a lesser degree of protection than
the federal Constitution and that the state must apply the more rigorous
command of the federal Constitution. My discussion should imply no
preference for the decision to be made under the state constitutions. I sug-
gest a process, not a result.
Many trace new federalism to the reaction against the Burger Court and
charge that new federalism is just a euphemism for a result-oriented doc-
trine. But I remind you that looking to the state's law, usually the state's
constitution, for protection of individual rights predates the Burger Court.
State protection of individual rights is as old as the nation.
In 1968, while the Warren Court was intact, Professor Countryman
urged the importance of a state bill of rights when talking to a constitu-
tional convention redrafting a state constitution. He reasoned that not all
the federal rights are applied to states through the fourteenth amendment;
modern society needs additional guarantees not found in the United States
Constitution, and the fourteenth amendment governs only state action, not
private action. The fourteenth amendment governs state infringement on
free speech or unreasonable search and seizure. State constitutions can
govern private action; thus California's free speech constitution, unlike the
first amendment, can be interpreted to protect high school students distrib-
uting hand bills at private shopping centers.43
42. The state court, in lieu of, or in addition to, relying on the state constitution, may
rely on a state statute, or use its supervisory authority over the administration of justice to
formulate a state rule. Decisions based on the state statutes or on the court's supervisory
power avoid the rigidities of a decision based on the state constitution.
43. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980).
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In Texas v. White and other cases the United States Supreme Court is
saying: State courts, look at your own state constitution. Whatever your
view of the merits of new judicial federalism, I conclude that as lawyers
and judges we must be alert to the concept, and we must deal with it.
Professor Dawson writes in a recent Texas Law Review 44 that Texas v.
White is not likely to be soon forgotten by the Texas bench or bar. His
reading of the Texas cases decided after Texas v. White demonstrates that
when the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals decides a fourth amendment
issue in favor of the defendant, the court routinely attaches a citation to the
Texas Constitution. He assumes that the lawyers cite the Texas Constitu-
tion. Professor Dawson does not detect any movement by the Texas courts
to determine independently of United States Supreme Court determina-
tions as to what Texas constitutional provisions mean for the criminal
process in Texas. The Texas Constitution is cited, but not analyzed.45 The
Wisconsin Supreme Court similarly all too often treats its constitution in
the same manner as the Texas courts.
Why don't the state courts turn to their own state constitution? It's a
puzzle. The state courts do analyze and rely on their own constitution if
there is no federal constitutional counterpart. They tend not to analyze
their constitutional provision if there is a federal counterpart. I see several
explanations. First, there is an understandable human tendency on the
part of state judges to view a United States Supreme Court decision on a
particular topic as the absolute, final truth. The Supreme Court said it; it
must be right. Second, habit explains a great deal. In the 1960s and 1970s
the lawyers and the courts got out of the habit of examining the state con-
stitutional claim. They examined the federal claim and no more. Third,
simplicity and ease. The fourteenth amendment establishes the minimum,
the floor below which the state cannot move. If the state action passes the
minimum requirement, the lawyer and court are loathe to go on. It is
easier for state judges and for lawyers to go along with the United States
Supreme Court than to strike out on their own to analyze the state
constitution.
It is not an easy task to decide the nature of the rights protected by the
state constitution. State constitutional law is rarely taught in law school. 46
State constitutional law was not even taught at my law school in the 1950s,
an era prior to the expansion of the fourteenth amendment. There are few
contemporary works devoted to state constitutional law or to the subject of
civil liberties under state constitutions.4 7 There are, as far as I know, no
44. Dawson, State-created Exclusionary Rules in Search and Seizure: A Study of the
Texas Experience, 59 TEx. L. REV. 191, 217 (1981).
45. Id at 216-17.
46. Professor Levinson of Vanderbilt University School of Law advises me that the law
schools' interest in state constitutional law has increased in recent years. At the January
1982 annual meeting of the Association of American Law Schools, a "standing room only"
audience heard a panel discussion on state constitutional law.
47. See, e.g., C. BROWNE, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS FROM INDEPEN-
DENCE TO THE PRESENT UNION, 1776-1959 (1973); B. CANNING, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTIONS, REVISIONS, AND AMENDMENTS, 1959-1976 (1977); J. DEALEY, GROWTH OF
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continuing legal education courses for the bar on state constitutional law.
Judicial education courses are beginning to include some mention of this
topic, but much time in judicial education courses is spent on a review of
recent United States Supreme Court decisions.
In the past fifteen years or so numerous pieces have appeared in the law
reviews on the concept of new federalism. And there are now appearing
single state analyses of state constitutional law developments. There are
excellent resource materials on the state constitutions, but they are not very
well known to the bench or bar. There is an Index Digest of State Consti-
tutions and a current compilation of state constitutions. In 1962 I worked
on the prior editions of the most recent Index Digest and the compila-
tion.48 I am not a Shirley-come-lately to the scene of state constitutional
law.
How am I as a state judge to decide what the state constitution means? I
use the same techniques as I use to decide what any law means. I try to
find the intent of the framers. First, I look at the language of the constitu-
tion. Then I go to the legislative history--the proceedings of the conven-
tion, the state constitutions upon which our constitution is based. I
examine the earlier decisions of our court, the decisions of sister courts,
and the decisions of the United States Supreme Court construing the same
or similar provisions. The reasoning of other courts may be persuasive. I
look at the peculiarities of my state-its land, its industry, its people, its
history. Alas, it would be easier for me just to read the writings of the
United States Supreme Court in the United States Law Week and follow
the teachings. Why take the hard road when you can take the easy path?
AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS (1915); C. KETTLEBOROUGH, THE STATE CONSTITU-
TIONS AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AND ORGANIC LAWS OF THE TERRITORIES AND
OTHER COLONIAL DEPENDENCIES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (1918); NAT'L
MUN. LEAGUE, THIRTY YEARS OF STATE CONSTITUTION-MAKING: 1938-1968 (1970); NEW
YORK STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMM., CONSTITUTIONS OF THE STATES AND
UNITED STATES (1938); B. POORE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL
CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1878); B.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 7; W. SWINDLER, SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTIONS (1973); F. THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, CO-
LONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATE, TERRITORIES, AND COLO-
NIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (1909); S. YARGER,
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS 1959-1975 (1976); David, Our California Constitu-
tions." Retrospections in This Bicentennial Year, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 697 (1976); Graves,
State Constitutional Law.4 Twenty-Fie Year Summary, 8 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (1966);
Mazor, Notes on a Bill of Rights in a State Constitution, 1966 UTAH L. REV. 326.
.48. See INDEX DIGEST OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS (R. Edwards ed. 2d ed. 1959); CON-
STITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES-NATIONAL AND STATE (S. Abrahamson ed. 1962). In
his foreword to the 1962 compilation, Professor Kernochan wrote:
The present Compilation, like the Index Digest, is part of a broad program
of state constitutional studies jointly developed some years ago by the Brook-
ings Institution, the National Municipal League and the Fund. In general
terms, the program calls for preparation of basic research aids, studies and
other materials designed to stimulate and assist civic groups, government offi-
cials, scholars and other interested persons to explore, to appraise and, hope-
fully, to reform a vital but neglected area of our government and law.
Kernochan, Foreword to CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES-NATIONAL AND STATE
at v (S. Abrahamson ed. 1962).
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I advocate the process of analyzing the state constitution because I think
such analysis has positive advantages. One advantage of such analysis is
diversity. We are at the same time a homogenous and an heterogenous
culture, and we should have both a homogenous (national) and heteroge-
nous (state) legal culture. We have uniform state laws like the commercial
code. Yet, our states have different laws governing property, marriage, di-
vorce, and torts. Your rights to recover in an auto accident depend sub-
stantially upon which state's law applies. All the differences in our state
constitutions are not accidents of draftsmanship. Some of these differences
reflect differences in our tradition. Texas's Constitution has an equal
rights amendment; Wisconsin's Constitution does not.
When the federal Supreme Court decides a case limiting the powers of
the states, the decision is one of national applicability and, hence, the
Court is properly loath to establish a rule unless it can be implemented
effectively nationwide. A state supreme court has more limited geographi-
cal responsibility. Moreover, the Supreme Court of the United States is
the court most remote from the problems of everyday concern for the ad-
ministration of justice within a state and is less able to make a determina-
tion of the practical appropriateness of a new rule. New federalism serves
as a reminder to state courts that they should experiment with new ap-
proaches that, if successful, may later be applied nationwide by the United
States Supreme Court. State experimentation serves to guide the Supreme
Court in its determinations.
Some lawyers are bothered by this diversity, bothered that unreasonable
search and seizure might mean one thing in Texas and another in Wiscon-
sin. I am not disturbed; the minimal guarantee is the same in both states,
the federal safety net. And uniformity in law, like some nationalized
franchise restaurants, brings security of product, but offers no exciting
surprises.
In addition to diversity, a second advantage I see to the new federalism
is stability. When state courts indiscriminately blanket United States
Supreme Court decisions into the state's jurisprudence by basing their
holdings on federal law, the law of the state changes each time the United
States Supreme Court changes its decisions.
Constitutional holdings of the United States Supreme Court can be vol-
atile. They change more frequently than we generally assume. A recent
article in the Wisconsin Law Review49 points out that forty-seven constitu-
tional holdings were reversed by the United States Supreme Court in the
period from 1960 to 1979. Search and seizure of automobiles, the issue in
Texas v. White, is an example of a field of federal constitutional law that is
in a state of change. The rights of states' citizens in relation to their own
state government can be protected from the vagaries and shifts of the
United States Supreme Court.
In this connection I note that the exclusionary rule, the rule that evi-
49. Maltz, Some Thoughts on the Death of Stare Decisis in Constitutional Law, 1980 Wis.
L. REV. 467.
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dence seized illegally cannot be used at a state trial, was adopted by statute
in Texas in 1925.50 The statute is still on the books. The exclusionary rule
was imposed on the states as part of the fourteenth amendment in Mapp v.
Ohio I1 in 1961, thirty-six years after Texas adopted the exclusionary rule.
The exclusionary rule, as articulated in Mapp v. Ohio, is in substantial
danger of being overruled. Even if the United States Supreme Court over-
turns the exclusionary rule, the rights of Texas and Wisconsin citizens
would not be affected: The protections afforded by state statute in Texas
and by the Wisconsin Constitution 52 independently protect the right of the
people to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures, regardless
of the holdings of the United States Supreme Court.
Hence, whatever may be the virtues and flaws of the exclusionary rule, it
can be preserved in the states of Wisconsin and Texas by the people of
these states regardless of the shifting sands of federal doctrine. Judge Rob-
erts of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals made this very point in his
dissent in Gillett v. State 53 in which he laid the foundation for an in-
dependent interpretation of the Texas Constitution.
The Wisconsin and Texas exclusionary rules can be preserved, because
the federal courts do not have jurisdiction over cases that arise under state
law or state constitutions. Thus the states may interpret their own consti-
tutions and their own laws as they see fit, provided always that the states
do not lessen the rights guaranteed by the federal Constitution. When a
state decision interpreting its own statutes or constitution is more protec-
tive of a citizen's rights than the United States Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of the federal Constitution, the federal court will not review the state
court decision if it rests on "adequate and independent state grounds.",
The reason for the federal court's not reviewing state decisions resting on
adequate and independent state grounds is founded on the Constitution
itself. In 1945 Justice Jackson in Herb v. Pitcairn54 explained:
This court from the time of its foundation has adhered to the princi-
ple that it will not review judgements of state courts that rest on ade-
quate and independent state grounds. . . . The reason is so obvious
that it has rarely been thought to warrant statement. It is found in the
partitioning of power between the state and federal judicial systems
and in the limitations of our own jurisdiction. Our only power over
state judgments is to correct them to the extent that they incorrectly
adjudge federal rights. And our power is to correct wrong judgments,
not to revise opinions. We are not permitted to render an advisory
opinion, and if the same judgment would be rendered by the state
court after we corrected its views of federal laws, our review could
amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion.55
50. The history of Texas's exclusionary rule is discussed in Dawson, supra note 44.
51. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
52. See Hoyer v. State, 180 Wis. 407, 193 N.W. 89 (1923).
53. 588 S.W.2d 361, 367 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (en banc); see Dawson, supra note 44,
at 217-19.
54. 324 U.S. 117 (1945).
55. Id at 125-26 (citations omitted).
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By relying upon their own state constitutions, state courts are able to
insulate their decisions from federal review. What are adequate and in-
dependent state grounds could be the subject of discussion for a substantial
part of a course on federal jurisdiction. 56 Suffice it to say that new federal-
ism can result in less federal judicial review of state court decisions.
Thus some oppose the new federalism, saying the state courts are
thwarting and evading judicial review. Sounds wicked, unlawful. But it is
not. It is entirely appropriate in our federal system for state courts to base
their decisions on state law, free of federal intervention.
And the United States Supreme Court is in a way encouraging the
courts to cut off its review. My case in point is one very close to University
Park. On February 23, 1982, the United States Supreme Court decided
City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc. 57 This case was originally tried
by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas at
Dallas.5 8 It went to the Fifth Circuit -9 and then to the United States
Supreme Court. This case involves Pac-Man and Space Invaders. The
City of Mesquite adopted an ordinance prohibiting children under the age
of seventeen from playing coin-operated games unless accompanied by a
parent or guardian. Aladdin's Castle sued in federal court for declaratory
and injunctive relief on the ground that the age restriction impermissibly
trammels the children's constitutional interest in associational freedoms.
To put it into non-legalese, the children are saying they want to be with
their friends.
The jurisdiction of the federal district court was based on diversity and
federal questions. The federal court of appeals held the ordinance uncon-
stitutional, apparently resting its decision on its interpretation of the Texas
Constitution as well as the federal Constitution. The Fifth Circuit said:
56. See Oregon v. Kennedy, 50 U.S.L.W. 4544, 4545, 4547 n.l (U.S. May 24, 1982)
(Stevens, J., concurring); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 652-54 (1979).
In his remarks to the American Judicature Society on Aug. 6, 1982, Justice Stevens was
critical of the Court's unwillingness to allow state courts to make the final decision in cases
in which the state court remains free to reinstate its prior judgment by unambiguously rely-
ing on state rather than federal law. Justice Stevens said:
The decision to review (and to reverse summarily without argument) a novel
holding by a California intermediate appellate court concerning the burden of
proof in an obscenity trial, or an equally novel holding by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court concerning a police officer's order commanding the driver of a
vehicle to get out of his car after a traffic violation, are additional examples of
the many cases in which the Court has been unwilling to allow a state court to
provide one of its residents more protection than the Federal Constitution re-
quires even though the state decision affected only a limited territory and did
not create a conflict with any other decision on a question of federal law, and
even though the state court had the power to reinstate its original judgment by
relying on state law. A willingness to allow the decision of other courts to
stand until it is necessary to review them is not a characteristic of this Court
when it believes that error may have been committed.
Remarks by Justice John Paul Stevens, Annual Banquet of the American Judicature Society,
San Francisco, California (Aug. 6, 1982).
57. 50 U.S.L.W. 4210 (U.S. May 24, 1982).
58. 434 F. Supp. 473 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
59. 630 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1980).
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"We hold that the seventeen year old age requirement violates both the
United States and Texas constitutional guarantees of due process of law,
and that the application of this age requirement to coin-operated amuse-
ment centers violates the federal and Texas constitutional guarantees of
equal protection of the law."'60
The United States Supreme Court concluded that it could not determine
from the court of appeals' opinion whether the court of appeals placed
independent reliance on Texas law or merely treated the Texas constitu-
tional protections as congruent with the corresponding federal provisions.
In other words, the United States Supreme Court couldn't tell whether the
Texas Constitution provided an adequate and independent ground for the
court of appeals' judgment. The United States Supreme Court held that it
would not decide the novel federal constitutional question presented by
Mesquite if Texas law provided independent support for the court of ap-
peals'judgment. 61 So the United States Supreme Court remanded the case
to the court of appeals to decide whether its opinion rested on Texas or
federal law.62
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, said some interesting things
about state constitutional law. He said:
It is first noteworthy that the language of the Texas constitutional
provision is different from, and arguably significantly broader than,
the language of the corresponding federal provisions. As a number of
recent state supreme court decisions demonstrate, a state court is en-
tirely free to read its own constitution more broadly than this Court
reads the Federal Constitution, or to reject the mode of analysis used
by this Court in favor of a different analysis of its corresponding con-
stitutional guarantee. See generally Brennan, State Constitutions and
the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489 (1977), and
cases cited therein. Because learned members of the Texas bar sit on
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and because that court
confronts questions of Texas law in the regular course of its judicial
business, that court is in a better position than are we to recognize any
special nuances of state law. The fact that the Court of Appeals cited
only four Texas cases is an insufficient basis for concluding that it did
not make an independent analysis of Texas law.63
Justice White and Justice Powell dissented from the remand. Their
opinions question why the United States Supreme Court did not reach the
merits of the issue.64
The Mesquite case tells us that federal courts can base their decisions on
state constitutions, and the United States Supreme Court will not review
interpretations of state constitutional law, whether the interpretation is
made by the federal or state courts. Thus, federal courts can protect their
60. Id at 1038-39 (footnotes omitted).
61. 50 U.S.L.W. 4210, 4212 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1982).
62. Id at 4213.
63. Id at 4212.
64. Id at 4213-15.
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decisions from United States Supreme Court review by resting them on
state constitutional grounds.65 Of course, then the federal courts are sub-
ject to later "review" by the state courts on the state law issue.
As you can see, it is entirely appropriate for state courts to evade
Supreme Court review by basing a decision on state law. On the other
hand, it is not appropriate for state courts to object to the United States
Supreme Court's establishing minimal national rights, the federal safety
net. For new federalism to work, the United States Supreme Court and
the state courts must maintain a healthy respect for the role each plays.
State court judges are not asking the United States Supreme Court to
cease interpreting the fourteenth amendment. Let me give you an example
of the state court judges being protective of the jurisdiction of the federal
courts. As you know from the newspapers there are some twenty bills in
Congress seeking to take away substantive jurisdiction of the federal courts
in certain areas, including prayer in public schools, abortion, school bus-
ing, and sex discrimination in the armed services. These bills would also
prohibit review by the United States Supreme Court of state court deci-
sions in some of these areas.
A subcommittee of the State-Federal Relations Committee of the Con-
ference of Chief Justices of the States studied these bills, not in terms of
their constitutionality, but in terms of their policy. The subcommittee
noted that these bills would have two results. First, the bills would make
the existing Supreme Court interpretations in these taboo areas the law of
the land forever. The bills would cast the existing federal constitutional
law in concrete. Second, fifty state supreme courts would apply the federal
Constitution in new fact situations without any single continuing unifying
interpretation by the United States Supreme Court. A single interpreta-
tion of the Constitution is one thing, but fifty interpretations of one federal
Constitution is another.66
The state chief justices are not happy about the bills. They suspect that
Congress was going to give the state courts power, because Congress
65. The Mesquite majority commented on avoidance of Supreme Court appellate re-
view by the federal courts as follows:
Our dissenting brethren suggest that our "view allows federal courts overrul-
ing state statutes to avoid appellate review here simply by adding citations to
state cases when applying federal law,"post, at 3 (Powell, J., dissenting). We
are unwilling to assume that any federal judge would discharge his judicial
responsibilities in that fashion. In any event, in this case we merely hold that
the Court of Appeals must explain the basis for its conclusion, if there be one,
that the state ground is adequate and independent of the federal ground.
Id at 4213 n.18. For a discussion of Mesquite, see Nat'l L.J., Apr. 19, 1982, at 5, col. 1. See
also Schmidt v. Oakland Unified School Dist., 50 U.S.L.W. 3998 (U.S. June 21, 1982) (per
curiam).
66. Subcommittee of the State-Federal Relations Committee, Report to the Conference
of Chief Justices on Pending Federal Legislation to Deprive Federal Courts of Jurisdiction
in Certain Controversial Areas Involving Questions of Constitutional Law, Conference of
Chief Justices Midyear Meeting, Williamsburg, Virginia (Jan. 28-30, 1982); see also State-
ment of W. Ward Reynoldson, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Iowa, before The Brookings
Institution Fifth Seminar on the Administration of Justice, Williamsburg, Virginia (Jan. 31,
1982).
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thought that state court judges would not enforce existing federal rights
with the same vim and vigor as their sisters and brothers on the federal
bench. The chief justices were somewhat offended, indeed miffed, in being
so viewed by Congress. The state chief justices went on record questioning
the wisdom of these bills. 67 The chief justices view the bills as a hazardous
experiment on the vulnerable fabric of the nation's judicial system.
The terms federalism and states' rights are value laden. They conjure
up images of secession from the national government, separatist move-
ments, and retention of the status quo in face of change. Ironically, the
modern version of new federalism calls upon the states, state courts, not
merely to negate the federal influence, but to develop a body of state law
for the protection of their citizens.
The new federalism proposed by the Burger Court makes life difficult
for state judges, because it challenges them to make federalism work. To
quote Chief Justice Burger: "The 50 states cannot exercise leadership in a
national sense, but this does not mean they should not be allowed the inde-
pendence and freedom that was plainly contemplated by the concept of
federalism. ' 68 I concur.
I recognize that the practice of making every case a federal claim will
die hard. I recognize that the practice of looking to the United States
Supreme Court for all law will die hard. I recognize that it will take a long
time before courts, as a matter of routine, look to their own state law, espe-
cially their own constitutions.
Nevertheless, I think we must begin to change our ways.
State constitutions are coming out of the archives into the legal literature
and into the classroom. They are coming out of the literature and the
classroom into the courtroom. State constitutions will go from the court-
room back into the legal literature and into the classroom, and may-
be back to the courtroom, through the lawyers trained in the 1980s. And
finally, state constitutions are beginning to come into popular conscious-
ness through the media.69 I think this is a good trend.
Today I carry with me from Wisconsin to Texas the admonition of Jus-
tice Smith of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in the 1855 case of The Attor-
ney General ex rel. Bashford v. Barstow.70 The justice's words in 1855 may
serve state supreme courts well in 1982. Speaking of Wisconsin, he said:
"The people then made this constitution, and adopted it as their primary
law. The people of other states made for themselves respectively, constitu-
67. The Conference of Chief Justices adopted a resolution criticizing the bills pending
in Congress at the 1982 Midyear Meeting.
68. Burger, The Interdependence of Our Freedoms, 9 AKRON L. REV. 403, 406 (1976).
69. See, e.g., Flaherty, "States' Rights"Are Our Rights, Too, 46 THE PROGRESSIVE, Feb.
1982, at 40; Lewin, Avoiding the Supreme Court, N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1976 (Magazine), at
31, 98; Margolick, State Judiciaries Are Shaping Law That Goes Beyond Supreme Court, N.Y.
Times, May 19, 1982, at Al, col. 1. On Sept. 20, 1982, The National Law Journal instituted a
regular feature on state constitutional law to be written by Ronald K.L. Collins. See The
Move to Free State Courtsfrom the Potomac's Ebb & Flow', Nat'l L.J., Sept. 20, 1982, at 28,
col. 3.
70. 4 Wis. 567 (1855).
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tions which are construed by their own appropriate functionaries. Let
them construe theirs-let us construe, and stand by ours."'71
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